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1. INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of transport system 
management is safe, efficient and economics 
justified realization of transport processes, by 
existing technology, organization and economics 
conditions. Transport safety is just one of  the 
basic feature of each transport system. The 
essential issue in transport safety management is 
estimation of all possible risks in analyzed 
transport system.  
 The main goal of risk analysis in transport is 
working out sensible basis to make decisions 
related loss avoiding, which can happen at any 
level of transport management and in any place of 
concrete transport system, [1]. The first stage of 
that process is risk analysis where risk size is 
estimated. Risk analysis in transport systems is a 
structural process of identification both 
possibilities and range of losses caused in system 
and/or its surrounding.  
Risk analysis comes to choice of “the best” 
method, which allow to: 1. danger identification 
(undesirable events); 2. frequency estimation of 
undesirable events; 3. consequences estimation of 
undesirable events; 4. reconstruction of possible 
emergency scenarios. 
Risk analysis depends on „dangers map” in 
analyzed transport system. The map shows 
potential losses in: 1. system structure; 2. system 
work processes; 3. negative effects of system 
behavior. This is a main idea of that conception. 
This is a simple implication of triple interpretation 
of complex system which is each transport system.  
Problems of risk analysis has a rich 
bibliography and it is not a place for exact review. 
Representative literature related to analysis 
methods, valuation and risk control in technology, 
also in transport is in author’s monograph, [2]. 
From extensive monograph foreign publications of 
risk analysis are [3], [4], [5], [6].  
Risk management problem from years is in 
articles published in famous magazines of safety 
ad reliability. From earliest publications are [7], 
[8].  
From 2000 year there are tries of harmonizing 
risk management methods in technology, but up to 
now there is not general European standard in this 
subject, [9]. It relates also risk management in 
transport. Recommendations for further works on 
risk estimation in transport are among others in 
report, [10]. On the other hand risk estimation 
criteria in transport safety programs are a subject 
of among others of a report [11].  
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New research approaches in the range of transport 
risk management can be searched in supply chain risk 
management. Research perspectives in that range are in 
one of the newest publication [12]. The example 
conception of new approach to those problems is 
shown in the lecture [13].  
 
2. THREE “STAGES” OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSPORT 
„Three stages“ conception of transport risks 
(3S-TR) are signalized in non published work [14]. 
This conception comes out from three different 
definitions of general system [15]: 
1. structural definitions – which relate to internal 
system construction; 
2. functional definitions – which relate to system 
functioning by processes identification as a 
changes carrier of system (features change fol-
lows by process);  
3. model-simulation definitions – which allow for 
observation and prediction system behavior in 
determined conditions of activity.  
 
Structural system interpretation relate to classic 
definition of L. von Bertalanffy, where the system 
is “a collection of elements which stay in 
relations”, [16]. Structural definitions describe the 
system by: a. elements collection; b. relation 
collection between elements; c. goal – that is 
system-creating relation. Functional interpretation 
of system relate to short definition of M. 
Mesarović, [17]: “system is a collection of 
relations between its features”. Relations between 
features describe system functioning. Researched 
those relations we can state if system functioning 
is normal. Systems functioning in cybernetics 
represents as transformation of entries to 
surroundings. Each system has some features and 
change one value or few features is an event. 
Series of events determine system functioning. The 
process goal is achieving by system preferred (in 
determined time period) effects (products, results) 
which determine new system phases. In that sense 
system phase is a collection of its essential 
features. Functional definitions put an accent on 
processes identification which are in system. In 
transport system there are four interesting process 
groups: 1. traffic processes; 2. steering processes; 
3. loading processes (initial-final); 4. disturbing 
processes.  
Model-simulation interpretations put the accent 
on observation and prediction of system behavior 
in determined conditions of activity. Simulations 
give possibility of prediction the hypothesis 
consequences of system activity and verification 
and choose of analyzed variants of system activity.  
So according to 3S-TR conception risk analysis 
should be provided on each three planes (levels): 
4. plane of transport system structure; 
5. plane of work processes in transport system; 
6. plane of transport system “behaviors” that is de 
facto – level of “negative effects of transport” 
(NETs). 
 
It is all about: 1. structural risks – generated by 
elements and relations which create system 
structure; 2. functional risks – generated by 
working system processes; 3. system risks – 
generated by system in long term and related with 
danger of falling system into undesirable 
situations, that is such, which generate losses; for 
example transport accidents  
2.1. STRUCTURAL RISK (SR) 
STAGE/PLANE I 
If the structural definition would be used in 
“transport system” then at level of “elements” and 
“relations”, that is at level “structure of system” 
can be analyzed different risks; they can be called 
as “structural risks”. Structural risks should be 
relate to undesirable changes of transport system 
structure. Precisely “structural risks” come out 
from dangers “which are effect of such changes of 
number and elements features and changes of 
system structure that in system and in surrounding 
can be generated losses”, [18, p. 68].  
Structural risks are dependent on effects of all 
undesirable interactions between elements of 
transport system structure, it means such which 
generate losses in that system. Helpful is here 
classification proposed in non published lecture 
[18]. After some modification it is presented below 
(table 1). Marks: RF– risk factor; HF – human 
factor in transport; MT – means of transport; TI – 
transport infrastructure; N – norms, rules, 
procedures; TA – transport accident; → - 
implication operator; ˄  - conjunction operator. 
There should be also analyzed relations: TA → 
AE, (AE – accident effect). 
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Formally structural risk factors are relations 
and intuitively relation means in system a relation 
between system elements. For example about 
relation CL ˄  N → we say: if there is simultaneity 
(implication) CL and N, then there is an accident 
 
Table 1. Classification structural risk factors of accident with propositions of analysis that risk 
Risk RF→ TA Structural risk factor 
 relations 1-argument  Individual risk factors 
SR1 HF → TA Human factor 
SR2 MT → TA Damage means of transport 
SR3 TI → TA Defect/damage of transport infrastructure 
SR4 N → TA Wrong norms, bad rules 
 relations 2-arguments  
SR5 HF ˄  MT → TA „wrong fit of means of transport to human-operator” 
SR6 HF ˄  IT → TA „wrong reading a transport infrastructure elements” 
SR7 HF ˄  N → TA „norm breaking and road regulations” 
SR8 MT ˄  IT → TA Effects at: means of transport – transport infrastructure  
SR9 MT ˄  N → TA „norms for means of transport” 
RS10 TI ˄  N → TA „norms of designing and IT exploitation” 
SR11 HF ˄  HF → TA  
 
 
Such relations (interactions) are possible to become in road transport 
systems, but it is difficult to give them unequivocal definition. 
 
SR12 MT ˄  MT → TA 
SR13 TI ˄  TI → TA 
SR14 N ˄  N → TA 
 relations 3-arguments 
SR15 HF ˄  MT ˄  TI → TA 
SR16 HF ˄  MT ˄  N → TA 
SR17 N ˄  MT ˄  TI → TA 
SR18 HF ˄  N ˄  TI → TA 
 relations 4-arguments 




2.2. FUNCTIONAL RISKS (FR) – 
STAGE/PLANE II 
Structural dangers can change into dangers of 
second level, more difficult – as I think – to 
identify and estimation. Dangers of 2
nd
 plane are 
effects of such changes of system properties, that 
in system and surrounding can be generated losses. 
And risks related with properties changes are 
“functional risks” – that is risks (non controlled) of 
undesirable changes for safety of work processes 
in system (e.g. traffic is a such process in road 
transport system). Theoretically for general system 
can be mentioned five changes then five types of 
functional system dangers, [18]: 
1. shaking dynamic balance of system; 
2. disturbing information processes in system; 
3. disturbing steering processes; 
4. disturbing self-regulation of system; 
5. shaking integration of system. 
 
With each danger is associated risk of not 
fulfilling by system desirable functions 1 – 5. It 
would be for sure difficult to interpreted dangers 1 
– 5 for transport system. Less general level of 
reflections is need. That is why the interpretation 
of “process approach to transport system” was 
used, [15]. According to it for transport activity 
consist three basic processes:  
1. process of shaping transport infrastructure: a. 
infrastructure planning; b. infrastructure reali-
zation; c. infrastructure exploitation. 
2. process of transport realization, which can be 
defined as follows: transport process include 
group of organization activities, administra-
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tive realized by experts in exact order by us-
ing means of transport for moving concrete 
loadings in exactly determined relations, [19]. 
Only moving that is traffic is a component of 
such defined process, and its importance for 
transport safety follows from that during this 
process more losses are generated.  
Process risks in other words functional risks 
are connected with three process groups exist-
ing in any transport system: 
 risks of losses in traffic processes – it is 
about losses risks related with decreasing 
traffic efficiency or transports efficiency; 
 risks of losses in initial-final processes: it re-
lates generally losses risks important for 
load chain realization, that is “logistics loss-
es”; they can be described by logistics indi-
cators; 
 risks of losses in transport steering process-
es: the example is here losses caused by 
wrong determined signalization cycles in 
traffic, or losses which come out of steering 
the landing and taking-off cycles of passen-
ger planes, steering subway trains, etc.  
3. process of transport Policy creating; this is a 
process of manage character which assure inte-
gration and coordination of all transport system 
elements. This process relies on conscious reac-
tion to cause concrete behaviors of institutions, 
companies or transport users, driven for goal 
realization, [15, p.9].  
 
Cooperation of those three processes is 
composed on transport system functioning.  
Functional risks in transport system are 
associated risks with three above processes; they 
can be defined as: 
FR1. risk of wrong infrastructure shaping  
FR2: risk of wrong transport services 
FRF3. risk of wrong transport policy; there are 
here particular. 
2.3. RISKS OF NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF 
TRANSPORT (NET’s-risks) – STAGE/PLANE 
III 
It seems that dangers of II level that is functional 
dangers can “release” undesirable behaviors of 
transport system observed in long term perspective. 
Those behaviors – system dangers called negative 
effects of transport (NET-s). They generate losses 
both in structure and in system surrounding. It is 
like 3
rd
 plane of dangers and connected with them 
risks, which we call as “NET risks”. Theoretically 
for general system can be mentioned also five 
types of system dangers [18, p. 69]: 1. lack of 
adaptive; 2. loss of accommodation abilities; 3. 
homeostasis disturbances; 4. increase stoppage (if 
the increase was desirable); 5. step changes of 
system parameters.  
With each danger is connected risk. But there 
are questions arise: 1. what is “lack of adaptive” of 
transport system?; 2. what is accommodation 
“ability loss ”  of transport system? etc. These are 
difficult questions and it is necessary to find 
simplifications; NET are them (negative effects of 
transport). Here can be described at least three 
groups: 
A. undesirable transport events – as states of work-
ing processes in transport system – which deter-
mine risk levels in transport system: 
 transport incidents; 
 transport conflicts; 
 transport collision; 
 transport accidents; 
 transport crashes; 
 
B. undesirable phases of natural environment (sur-
rounding of transport system): 
 losses in natural environment, 
 lowering the quality of life; 
 
C. undesirable phases of traffic schedule in area, 
that is phases of transport congestion.  
The most obvious and the most researched are 
risks of undesirable transport event, which defined 
transport safety problems by analysis transport 
accident risk, death risk in transport accident, risk 
of injury in transport accident, risk of transport 
catastrophes and others. Risks of appearing such 
events can be analyzed by: 
 different transport events models; e.g. mod-
els of road accidents; 
 marking out risk indicators in relation on 
empiric data; 
 simulation methods of traffic situations.  
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3. METHODS OF TRANSPORT RISKS 
ANALYSIS  
Risk analysis methods allow to account 
(estimate) risk in systems “HF - TI – MT” and  
according PrPN-IEC 603000-3-9 norm risk 
estimation is a process used to create measure of 
analyzed risk level. From that norm and known 
multiplicative formula of risk estimation comes 
out that choice of risk analysis method comes to 
the choice of “the best” method which allow to: 
1. danger identification (undesirable events); 
2. frequent estimation (possibilities) of undesira-
ble events; 
3. consequences estimation (effects) of undesira-
ble events; 
4. reconstruction of possible emergency scenarios 
(accidental). 
 
Above phases of risk analysis determine choice 
of risk analysis methods and are a criteria of such 
choice. There are not any directives for choice the 
risk analysis method; it relates also transport. 
Works on methodology of integrated risk 
management in transport still lasting.  
Taking “3S-TR conception” we can propose 
idea of next criteria of selection risk analysis 
method: 
1. for structural risks proper would be methods of 
“subject dangers” analysis, that is come from 
structure elements; 
2. for functional risks proper would be methods of 
“process dangers” analysis e.g. Process Safety 
Analysis (PSA); 
3. for system risks proper would be methods 
based on models and indicators of undesirable 
transport events; example are here methods 
from “Probabilistic Risk Analysis” (PRA). 
 
The choice of proper risk analysis method is more 
“an art” than “science”. Below in table 2 there is 
presented first version of choose of common risk 
analysis methods for transport. In another version it 
would be published in [1, s. 294-295].  
There is not placed helpful risk analysis methods 
such as: RM - result models; DM - delphic method; 
DI - danger indicators; ST - simulations techniques – 
e.g. Monte-Carlo simulation, others. The are also 
passed over the following norms: ISO 28000: 
managing safety in load chains, ISO 31000: Risk 
Management Guidance Standard; new ISO standard, 
currently at the phase of project including directives 
in the range of general risk management 
implementation. ISO 17799: "practical rules of safety 
management information" was published in January 
2007 as a PN-ISO/IEC 17799:2007. By practices is 
noticed as the best edition relates system approach to 
safety management information. And assume the 
following shorts of basic methods and other methods. 
Basic methods 
SR - Safety Review; RR - Relative Ranking; 
PHA - Preliminary Hazard Analysis; WI - “What -
if” Analysis; HAZOP - Hazard and Operability 
Analysis; FMEA - Failure Modes and Effect 
Analysis; ETA - Event Tree Analysis; FTA - Fault 
Tree Analysis; CCA - Cause Consequence 
Analysis; HRA - Human Reliability Analysis; 
QRA - Quantitative Risk Assessment. 
Other methods 
Barrier Analysis (BA) – method introduced by 
energetic sector; identify barriers counteracted 
accidents, damages and injuries arise. Barrier 
analysis is a quality method for accidents analysis. 
It is connected with MORT. 
Black Spot Analysis (BSA)– method of black 
point analysis; the philosophy relies on giving the 
sources there where are the lowest.  
Bow-Tie Analysis (B-TA) – Bow-Tie: left side 
wing shows danger for that factors which allow to 
avoid entering in accidents chain; right side wing 
shows consequences. Bow-tie is constructed in 
that way - “risk approach” should be minimal or 
impossible.  
Change Analysis (ChA) – technology of 
designing danger identification, which arise as a 
result of planned or non planned changes; used 
among others in post-accidental investigation.   
Swiss Cheese Model (SChM) -  
Following shortcuts mark: 
HF – human factor; MT – means of transport; 
TI – transport infrastructure; STS – surrounding  
of transport system; EF – external factors (floods, 
terrorist actions); AR – accident research; CA – 
central authorities; LG – local governments; TB – 
transport boards; T – transporters; PCT – 
production companies for transport. 
 




Risk management conception at “three stages” of 
any transport system is natural – it comes out of three 
possible transport system interpretation. From 
presented here 3S-RT conception follows 
reasonableness of analysis structural risks, functional 
(process) and system risks (NET’s risks). Such 
research approach indicates that there is not one 
transport risk but at least three forms of that.  
Presented here conception is an example of 
wider look on interpretation problems of modeling 
and risk analysis. A need of looking for analogies 
and integration conceptions in researches of safety 
of different technology systems is a necessity 
today. It comes out of 20year Geysen’s thesis: 
„(...) safety problems in different domains are 
often of the same nature and can be formalized in 
the same way”, [20].  
 Creating new methodology of transport risk 
management requires wider use and building 
safety models and risks in systems of 
“organization” type.  
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